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Abstract 
Based on the traditional agency theory, our objective is to analyse the relationship between 
institutional ownership and CEO compensation. We collected panel data of 1959 companies over 
the 22 years of period from 1992-2013, and found significant evidence that institutional 
shareholders influence corporate governance through CEO compensation. Greater institutional 
ownership concentration is negatively related with total CEO compensation, salary and options. 
In addition, ownership concentration is associated with greater use of behaviour-based 
compensation (salary). On the other hand, ownership level is associated with increased level of 
CEO compensation and greater use of incentive-based compensation (options). These results 
broadly confirm the idea that if there is a large institutional owner, compensation levels of CEO 
are lower; while, when there is dispersed ownership of many institutions, institutions are less 
likely to monitor. These results are broadly consistent with Hertzell and Starks (2003). 
 
Keywords: Institutional ownership; CEO compensation; Concentration; Ownership level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
First and foremost, we would like to thank our supervisor Amir Rubin, who gave us invaluable 
guidance on this interesting topic. He offered us detailed instructions with patience and inspired 
us to work and study in a more professional way. 
 
Besides, we want to express gratitude to the faculty at Beedie School of Business who lead us 
towards success in the past year. We also thank our beloved parents who gave us selfish love and 
support all the way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
Table of Contents 
Approval ....................................................................................................................................ii 
Abstract ....................................................................................................................................iii 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... iv 
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................... v 
1: Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 
2: Literature review .................................................................................................................. 1 
3: Hypothesis ............................................................................................................................. 3 
4: Method .................................................................................................................................. 4 
4.1 Sample .............................................................................................................................. 4 
4.2 Dependent Variables.......................................................................................................... 4 
4.2.1 Total compensation ................................................................................................. 4 
4.2.2 Salary ..................................................................................................................... 4 
4.2.3 Stock options .......................................................................................................... 5 
4.2.4 Salary as a percentage of total compensation ........................................................... 5 
4.2.5 Stock options as a percentage of total compensation ................................................ 5 
4.3 Independent variables ........................................................................................................ 5 
4.3.1 Top five institutional ownership .............................................................................. 5 
4.3.2 Total institutional ownership ................................................................................... 5 
4.4 Control variables ............................................................................................................... 5 
4.4.1 Market value ........................................................................................................... 6 
4.4.2 Annual Return ......................................................................................................... 6 
5: Univariate analysis ................................................................................................................ 6 
5.1 Sample distribution analysis .............................................................................................. 6 
5.2 Univariate analysis ............................................................................................................ 6 
6: Multivariate analysis ............................................................................................................. 7 
6.1 Hypothesis analysis ........................................................................................................... 7 
7:  Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 8 
8: Appendix ............................................................................................................................... 9 
Table 1 Sample distribution ..................................................................................................... 9 
Table 2 Cross section correlations ......................................................................................... 10 
Table 3 The relation between ownership variables and compensation variables ...................... 11 
 vi 
 
Table 4 Results of fixed firm and year effects ........................................................................ 12 
Table 5 Results of fixed industry and year effects .................................................................. 13 
9:  Reference ............................................................................................................................ 14 
 
 
1 
 
1: Introduction 
Institutional ownership refers to the ownership stake in a company that is held by large 
financial organizations, pension fund insurance companies and endowments. Recent years have 
seen dramatic growth of institutional ownership and now it shares almost 62% of the “pie”, 
compared with in 1965, when it only accounts for less than 20%.  
To better satisfy the objectives of outside investors, especially institutional shareholders, 
the importance of corporate governance cannot be stressed more since there exists interest 
conflicts-agency problem between management and its principals. The institutional investors now 
are more vocal about the levels and forms of the executive compensation. For example, new 
requirements were established by SEC authorities to extend shareholders a non-binding vote on 
executive compensation packages (Statement by Treasure Secretary Tim Geithner on 
Compensation on June 10, 2009). In the same year, the House of Representatives passed the 
“Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009” (H.R. 3269), which 
take into consideration of the ‘say on pay’ of all public institutions in the United States. In 
addition, the Act included a provision which favours shareholders’ vote on golden parachutes. 
Following was the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed by President Obama 
in 2010, which legally provides shareholders with the right to a non-binding vote on executive 
compensation. 
Thus an interesting topic is how shareholders, especially institutional investors, influence 
corporate executive compensation practices in firms they invest in. In our paper, we extend our 
empirical analysis for a longer period of time based on precious paper and try to figure out how 
institutional ownership affects CEO compensation. Thus the paper may offer substantial 
implications on the behaviour of institutional owners and the design of CEO compensation plans.  
2: Literature review 
There was an interesting survey conducted by Watson Wyatt, the result of which shows that 
90% of institutional shareholders think corporate executives are overpaid (Watson Wyatt, 2005). 
The finding can partially serve to explain the active involvement of institutional shareholders in 
corporate governance, which mostly concentrate on executive compensations and boards of 
directors (Georgeson, 2000, 2005). 
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Agency problem, in corporate finance, which refers to a conflict of interest between a 
company's management and the company's stockholders, was first popularized by Berle and 
Means (1932) and afterwards has been applied in broader academic fields. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) then formalized the agency relations by pointing out the monitoring expenditure by 
principal and bonding expenditure by the agents, based on which they took steps forward to 
analyse executive compensation incentives. Beatty and Zajac (1994) updated the theory by 
considering the costs of incentives and monitoring in large corporations as well as their benefits. 
Traditional agency researchers have proved that principals (institutional investors) can effectively 
monitor agents (managers) and use outcome-based incentive contracts to alleviate principal-agent 
conflict of interests.  
Institutional shareholders played an important monitoring role in mitigating the agency 
problem between shareholders and managers, stressed by Jay C. Hartzell and Laura T. Starks 
(2003). More specifically, evidenced from Hong Kong, a finding showed that in the presence of 
information asymmetry, entrenched managers would extract higher compensations for themselves 
at the advantage of shareholders.  There is also weaker evidence that top executives with larger 
shareholdings may be using dividends as a way of supplementing their cash salaries (Yan-Leung 
Cheung, Aris Stouraitis *, Anita W.S. Wong, 2005). Some scholars analyzed public listed 
companies and maintained that CEO compensation risk is significantly higher in a company with 
a higher level of aggregate institutional holdings excluding top five holdings (Yixi Ning & 
Xiankui Hu & Xavier Garza-Gomez, 2012). 
Ample empirical evidence support that the activism of institutional shareholders effectively 
limits management’s power over the boards of directors which has the final say on compensation 
decisions. An interesting thing is that equity-based compensation awards and grants will dilute 
the shareholders’ rights. Thus institutional owners may use the organizations’ approval as a 
bargaining tool when managers turn to their principals for approval of compensation plans.  As a 
result, researchers (Pamela Brandes, Maria Goranova, and Steven Hallhow, 2008) surveyed how 
management tries to work with owners to secure their compensation packages. 
Based on agency theory, people investigated how institutional ownership concentration and 
ownership level affect CEO compensation, pay mix, stock option and pay sensitivity, and found 
that largest owner’s concentration is associated with lower levels of compensation, as well as 
with higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total 
compensation (Raihan Khan, Ravi Dharwadkar*, Pamela Brandes, 2002). Research also 
supported previous conclusions, and added that clientele effects exist among institutions for firms 
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with certain compensation structure (Jay. C Hartzell, Laura T. Starks*, 2003). Evidence suggests 
that greater institutional ownership level is associated with greater emphasis on incentive-based 
compensation (higher pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation), and total 
compensations for CEO (C. F. Sirmans, 2010). 
3: Hypothesis 
Monitoring role of institutional investors is an important corporate governance 
mechanism for corporate management. Theory suggests, and empirical evidence confirms, that 
institutional shareholders are advantageous over smaller, more passive or less-informed investors 
(Hill and Snell, 1989) in that they can provide active monitoring at a lower cost, such as their 
voting power, shareholder activism, election of board members, and their abilities to influence 
management decisions. As mentioned above, large institutional shareholders may also negotiate 
with management in a manner to neutralize the interests. Additionally it is not hard to believe that 
large institutional shareholders have more power and expertise over large individual stockholders 
(Cubbin and Leech, 1983). 
Thus, our paper will collaborate on the traditional agency theory to get an insight. From 
concentration of institutional ownership perspective (Top Five Institutional Ownership), we can 
expect that the greater the holdings of the largest institutional owner, the greater their ability to 
influence CEO compensation, including salaries, options granted, and total compensation. 
Combined with previous analysis, it is expected that ownership concentration will decrease 
compensation levels and will vote for greater salary compensation and reduce incentive-based 
payment as CEO compensation. 
Distinct from concentration of institutional ownership, the greater ownership level may 
lead to weaker monitoring because of the higher coordination costs among diversified 
shareholders (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1994). As mentioned above, 
dispersed shareholders reduce the ability of shareholders to remove and monitor managerial 
activity. Ownership level also provides managers incentives to exploit their protected positions 
and extract benefits for themselves (Julie Ann Elston, 2001). It is also proved that non-diversified 
shareholders would be reluctant to provide executive with option compensation, while diversified 
shareholders would prefer it (Alan Kraus, Amir Rubin, 2009). 
Thus, with the increase of the number of institutional owners, the marginal benefit of 
monitoring management decreases because greater costs will be needed to coordinate among 
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dispersed investors. From the level of institutional ownership perspective, we expect that 
incentive-based compensation will be favoured from the standing point of dispersed shareholders. 
Hypothesis: Institutional ownership concentration will be negatively related to 
compensation levels, positively related to behaviour-based compensation, and negatively related 
to outcomes-based compensation. Institutional ownership level will be positively related to 
compensation levels, negatively related to behaviour-based compensation, and positively related 
to outcomes-based compensation. 
4: Method 
4.1 Sample 
In this study, we used the panel data set and OLS regression to investigate the relationship 
between institutional ownership and CEO compensation. The data for the analysis is collected 
from three databases. First, we collected annual CEO compensation data over 1992-2013 from 
ExecuComp database at the Wharton Research Data Services. Second, we collected end-of-year 
institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters at WRDS by keeping the companies and time 
zone the same as that of CEO compensation. Third, we collected annual return data from CRSP at 
WRDS in a similar way. The dependent variable was lagged by one year in order to make the 
results more accurate. We have 12922 observations for our final analysis in total.  
4.2 Dependent Variables 
4.2.1 Total compensation 
This variable is defined as the value of all the components of CEO compensation 
(Execomp item TDC1）for a specific year.  
4.2.2 Salary 
This variable is defined as the value of the base salary (Execomp item SALARY) earned 
by the CEO during the year. In our study, we use salary as a measure of behaviour-based 
compensation. 
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4.2.3 Stock options  
This variable is defined as the value of stock options granted to CEO during the year 
(Execomp item OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE). In our study, we use stock options as a 
measure of outcome-based compensation. 
4.2.4 Salary as a percentage of total compensation 
This variable is defined as salary divided by total compensation. We use this variable to 
illustrate the extent of behaviour-based compensation affected by institutional ownership. 
4.2.5 Stock options as a percentage of total compensation 
This variable is defined as stock options divided by total compensation. We use this 
variable to illustrate the extent of outcome-based compensation affected by institutional 
ownership. 
4.3 Independent variables  
4.3.1 Top five institutional ownership 
This variable is defined as the sum of the top five institutional investors divided by total 
institutional ownership (Thomson Retuers item top5instown) (Amir, 2007). We consider this 
variable as a measure of institutional ownership concentration. 
4.3.2 Total institutional ownership 
This variable is defined as the total equity holdings by institutional investors (Thomson 
Retuers item Total Inst. Ownership, Percent of Shares Outstanding). We use total institutional 
ownership as a measure of institutional ownership level. 
4.4 Control variables 
There are several possible other explanations for the relationship between CEO compensation 
and institutional ownership. 
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4.4.1 Market value 
This variable is defined as the price (Thomson Retuers item End of Qtr Share Price) of 
stock multiplied by number of shares outstanding (Thomson Retuers item End of Qtr Shares 
Outstanding in 1000s). 
4.4.2 Annual Return 
Another variable we controlled is annual return for each company. In general, CEO 
compensation is positively associated with Annual Return. Therefore, we controlled annual return. 
5: Univariate analysis 
5.1 Sample distribution analysis 
Table 1 reports summary statistics including means, standard deviations and sample 
distributions for the nine variables used in our analysis. From the table, we find that salary 
constitutes 35% of total compensation, whereas stock options constitute 32%. The mean and 
standard deviation of stock options is 1.595 million and 4.937 million respectively, which are 
substantially larger than those of salary (mean = US$.531 million, S.D. = US$.334 million). The 
mean of top five institutional ownership is nearly 44% (S.D. =.15) and the mean of total 
institutional ownership is nearly 60% (S.D. =.22).  
From the sample distributions, we also find that the compensation measures are highly 
skewed, therefore, we use the log of dependent variables respectively. 
5.2 Univariate analysis 
Table 2 reports the cross-sectional correlations obtained by the nine variables in our 
analysis.  
Panel A reports correlations between the two ownership variables. We can find that the 
correlation between top five institutional ownership and total institutional ownership is -
0.424(p<0.01), which is consistent with our hypothesis. 
Panel B reports correlations between compensation variables. The salary/total and 
option/total are negatively related since they are mutually exclusive in the total compensation 
base. Salary/option is positively associated with total compensation since the latter grow 
proportionately to the former two variables. 
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Panel C reports cross-sectional correlations between ownership and compensation 
variables. The table precisely shows the significant relation of dependent variables and 
independent variables. The hypothesis that institutional ownership concentration (represented by 
top five institutional ownership) is negatively related to compensation levels, positively related to 
behaviour-based compensation, and negatively related to outcome-based compensation is testified. 
6: Multivariate analysis 
In our analysis, we want to test the relation between institutional ownership and CEO 
compensation using the following model: 
CEO compensation = β0+β1（ownership variable）+β2(market value)+ β3(annual 
return)+εi 
Table 3 reports the regression results of the relationship between CEO compensation and 
institutional ownership to test the two hypothesizes. Column （1）、（2）、（3）、（4）、
（5）shows the results when using total compensation, salary, stock options, salary as a 
percentage of total compensation, options as a percentage of total compensation as dependent 
variable respectively. 
Table 4 and table 5 reports the regression results with firm and year fixed effect/industry 
and year fixed effect. We note that the value of R2 in table 4 and 5 is substantially larger than that 
in table 3, especially for table 4.  
6.1 Hypothesis analysis 
Hypothesis, which proposed that the concentration of institutional ownership would be 
negatively related to compensation levels including total compensation, salary and options, was  
supported for the top five institutional ownership in table 3(β= -1.838, P < .01; β= -.949, P < .01; 
β= -1.476, p<.01, respectively), table 4(β= -.747, P < .01; β= -.317, P < .01; β= -1.1, p<.01, 
respectively) and table 5(β= -1.729, P < .01; β= -.848, P < .01; β= -1.775, p<.01, respectively). In 
addition, we find that top five institutional ownership was associated with an increased 
percentage of salary to total compensation and a decreased percentage of options to total 
compensation, supported by table 3(β=.816, P < .01), table 4 (β=.374, P < .01; β= -.374, P < .01; 
respectively)and table 5(β=.805, P < .01; β= -.154, P < .01; respectively). 
Hypothesis, which proposed that institutional ownership level would be positively related 
to compensation levels including total compensation, salary and options, was supported by the 
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total institutional ownership in table 3(β=.978, P < .01; β=.468, P < .01; β=1.533, p<.01, 
respectively), table 4 ((β=.289, P < .01; β=.174, P < .01; β=.401, p<.01, respectively))and table 
5(β=.864, P < .01; β=.458, P < .01; β=1.038, p<.01, respectively). In addition, we find that the 
institutional ownership level was associated with a decreased percentage of salary to total 
compensation and an increased percentage of options to total compensation in table 3(β= -.547, P 
< .01; β=.588, P < .01; respectively), table 4(β= -.144, P < .01; β=.204, P < .01; respectively) and 
table5(β= -.423, P < .01; β=.363, P < .01; respectively).  
7:  Discussion 
In conclusion, we find that institutional ownership concentration has a negative effect on 
compensation levels illustrated by top-five institutional ownership and has the consistent result 
with hypothesis regarding to pay mix. We also find that institutional ownership level has a 
positive effect on compensation levels, which is illustrated by total institutional ownership. 
Besides, the result is in line with our original hypothesis regarding to the relationship between 
institutional ownership level and behaviour-based compensation/outcome-based compensation. 
That institutional ownership concentration has a negative effect on compensation levels 
was consistent with agency theory, which states that large institutional ownership concentration 
would increase monitoring on executives and large institutional owners have the ability to 
conduct more interference on executives’ compensation decisions.  
In addition, large institutional owners are more willing to use salary as compensation 
compared to options compensations. This is because institutional owners are not insiders and they 
cannot directly design compensation structure (Raihan Khan, 2004). Another possible explanation 
is that when the monitoring conducted by institutional owners increases, executives do not need 
to use outcome-based compensation to improve self-monitoring (Yixi Ning, 2012).  
The explanation why institutional ownership level has a positive effect on compensation 
levels is that when the total institutional ownership increases, which is probably due to the 
increase of the number of institutional owners, the effectiveness of monitoring would decrease 
and executives have more management discretion to make compensation decisions.  
Additionally, institutional owners are more willing to design option compensations 
compared to salary compensations. The previous research also indicates that the higher 
institutional ownership, the more option grants allocated to managers (Amir, 2008). This is 
because institutional shareholders possess professional expertise in comprehending and applying 
option grants compared to individual investors(Raihan Khan, 2004).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
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8: Appendix 
 
Table 1 Sample distribution 
 
Mean S.D 
 
 
Percentile 
   
   
1th 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 99th 
Total compensation levels(US$000) 
3445.04 6569.42 135.80 315.35 810.89 1628.45 3609.96 12240.48 29594.67 
Salary(US$000) 531.94 334.41 22.31 151.67 310.00 462.73 698.08 1038.46 1570.46 
Options(US$000) 1595.34 4937.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 396.78 1416.52 6546.85 18623.63 
Salary/total 0.35 0.25 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.29 0.48 0.91 1.00 
Options/total 0.32 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.53 0.83 0.96 
Market value(US$ million) 4921.37 17375.08 34.30 108.65 360.00 940.84 3010.44 20026.75 64031.13 
Annual return 0.03 0.13 -0.28 -0.16 -0.04 0.02 0.08 0.23 0.43 
Top five institutional ownership 0.44 0.15 0.21 0.25 0.34 0.42 0.52 0.74 0.92 
Total institutional ownership 
0.58 0.22 0.09 0.20 0.43 0.59 0.74 0.92 1.08 
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   Table 2 Cross section correlations 
 
Panel A 
Top five 
institutional 
ownership 
Total 
institutional 
ownership 
Top five 
institutional 
ownership 
1 
 
Total institutional 
ownership 
-0.424*** 1 
    
 
 
Panel B 
Total 
Compensation 
Salary Options Salary/total Options/total 
Total 
Compensation 
1 
    Salary 0.406*** 1 
   Options 0.881*** 0.207*** 1 
  Salary/total -0.410*** -0.193*** -0.321*** 1 
 Options/total 0.292*** 0.035*** 0.419*** -0.599*** 1 
                                                                                
                                        
 
Panel C 
Total 
Compensation 
Salary Options Salary/total Options/total 
Top five 
institutional 
ownership 
-0.208*** -0.307*** -0.132*** 0.263*** -0.109*** 
Total 
institutional 
ownership 0.113*** 0.207*** 0.085*** -0.235*** 0.160*** 
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Table 3 The relation between ownership variables and compensation variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ln(Total 
compensation) 
Ln(Salary) Ln(Options) Ln(Salary/total) Ln(Options/total) 
      
Market value 1.74e-05*** 7.45e-06*** 2.11e-05*** -1.02e-05*** 2.84e-06*** 
 (5.25e-07) (3.63e-07) (8.94e-07) (4.56e-07) (5.06e-07) 
Annual return 0.274*** -0.111** 0.690*** -0.386*** 0.301*** 
 (0.0686) (0.0467) (0.112) (0.0597) (0.0631) 
Top five 
institutional 
ownership 
-1.838*** -0.949*** -1.476*** 0.816*** 0.115* 
 (0.0694) (0.0473) (0.116) (0.0607) (0.0655) 
Total institutional 
ownership 
0.978*** 0.468*** 1.533*** -0.547*** 0.588*** 
 (0.0444) (0.0304) (0.0753) (0.0387) (0.0426) 
Constant 7.608*** 6.208*** 6.286*** -1.327*** -1.458*** 
 (0.0494) (0.0338) (0.0815) (0.0431) (0.0461) 
      
Observations 12,364 12,775 8,188 12,311 8,188 
R-squared 0.233 0.124 0.179 0.104 0.032 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.1 
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Table 4 Results of fixed firm and year effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ln(Total 
compensation) 
Ln(Salary) Ln(Options) Ln(Salary/total) Ln(Options/total) 
      
Market value 5.98e-06*** 7.90e-07 1.04e-05*** -5.09e-06*** 2.57e-06*** 
 (8.53e-07) (6.05e-07) (1.17e-06) (8.44e-07) (7.37e-07) 
Annual return 0.254*** 0.0305 0.557*** -0.247*** 0.172*** 
 (0.0578) (0.0413) (0.0868) (0.0573) (0.0546) 
Top five 
institutional 
ownership 
-0.747*** -0.317*** -1.100*** 0.374*** -0.374*** 
 (0.0783) (0.0556) (0.120) (0.0777) (0.0752) 
Total institutional 
ownership 
0.289*** 0.174*** 0.401*** -0.144** 0.204*** 
 (0.0641) (0.0458) (0.0943) (0.0636) (0.0593) 
Constant 6.952*** 5.771*** 5.954*** -1.091*** -1.226*** 
 (0.0621) (0.0444) (0.0923) (0.0616) (0.0581) 
      
Observations 12,364 12,775 8,188 12,311 8,188 
R-squared 0.660 0.567 0.730 0.484 0.606 
      Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.1 
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Table 5 Results of fixed industry and year effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ln(Total 
compensation) 
Ln(Salary) Ln(Options) Ln(Salary/total) Ln(Options/total) 
      
Market value 1.55e-05*** 6.15e-06*** 1.85e-05*** -9.49e-06*** 2.34e-06*** 
 (5.32e-07) (3.73e-07) (8.69e-07) (4.65e-07) (4.94e-07) 
Annual return 0.209*** -0.0709 0.495*** -0.286*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0681) (0.0471) (0.107) (0.0596) (0.0606) 
Top five 
institutional 
ownership 
-1.729*** -0.848*** -1.775*** 0.805*** -0.154** 
 (0.0689) (0.0477) (0.110) (0.0606) (0.0624) 
Total institutional 
ownership 
0.864*** 0.458*** 1.038*** -0.423*** 0.363*** 
 (0.0499) (0.0347) (0.0781) (0.0438) (0.0444) 
Constant 7.177*** 5.980*** 6.000*** -1.113*** -1.430*** 
 (0.0585) (0.0405) (0.0913) (0.0513) (0.0519) 
      
Observations 12,364 12,775 8,188 12,311 8,188 
R-squared 0.307 0.183 0.323 0.180 0.194 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.1 
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